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The 2008–09 financial crisis has highlighted the problems associated with currency 
mismatches on the balance sheets of emerging market borrowers, particularly in emerging 
Europe. Currency mismatches aggravated the crises in countries with large currency 
depreciations, such as Ukraine, and complicated the crisis response and induced highly 
contractionary macroeconomic policies in countries that defended their pegs, such as Latvia.  
 
As a result, the question of how these economies can better manage their foreign exchange 
(FX) risk—or even “de-dollarise”— is again receiving much attention in the ongoing policy 
debate.
1 It also has begun to translate into tougher regulation. For example, in December 
2009, Hungary adopted new regulations that require higher household debt servicing capacity 
and lower loan-to-value ratios for consumer and mortgage borrowing denominated in foreign 
exchange. Ukraine banned foreign exchange lending to households outright in late 2008 and 
set stringent provisioning requirements for FX lending to enterprises in June 2009. In 
Kazakhstan the authorities limit FX exposures through a variety of prudential measures (for 
example, higher provisioning for new FX loans to unhedged borrowers), and outright 
prohibition of lending in FX to unhedged borrowers is also under discussion. Poland, one of 
the first countries in the region to regulate FX lending (“Recommendation S”; see Box 1), has 
recently strengthened regulation further in the context of a general tightening of lending 
standards (“Recommendation T,” passed in February 2010). The European Commission has 
also contemplated introducing European Union (EU)–wide higher regulatory requirements on 
unhedged FX borrowers via macro prudential and capital requirements, although these are 
unlikely to be introduced any time soon.  
 
Proposals to tackle the FX lending problem mainly through regulation rest on an implicit 
assumption that foreign currency lending in the transition region was driven by forces similar 
to those underlying the precise capital inflow and credit boom more generally, namely, a 
subordination of fear (of the consequences of currency devaluation) to greed (borrowers’ 
desire for much cheaper borrowing terms and lenders’ desire to push out loans). But is this 
true? Our analysis provides some evidence that foreign financing was indeed a contributing 
factor to the FX lending boom and concludes that regulation does have a role to play in 
addressing the FX mismatch problem. However, even a cursory look at the data dispels the 
idea that financial dollarisation in emerging Europe is mainly a boom phenomenon and hence 
that it may have a simple cure based on national regulation. FX lending has been a long-
standing fixture in the transition region.
2 And while it increased sharply in some countries 
during the pre-crisis boom years—most notably, in Hungary—it declined in other countries, 
including Russia and Kazakhstan, which was also the target of very rapid capital inflows 
(chart 1).  
 
                                                 
1. Following the literature, we use the term “financial dollarisation,” “loan dollarisation” and “liability 
dollarisation” to denote the use of foreign currency in the financial system, and especially in bank lending to 
households, regardless of whether the currency used is the US dollar, the euro, or other currencies. A better term 
for most of the countries covered in this chapter would be “financial euroisation.” Regarding another 
terminology issue, this chapter uses the terms “emerging Europe” and “transition countries” interchangeably; 
some of the analysis even includes central Asian transition countries.  
2. See, for example, Sahay and Végh (1996). 
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 Source: CEIC database (www.ceicdata.com).  
  a. No comparable data available for Ukraine for 2004. In the cases of Croatia and Serbia, the values include 
estimated share of exchange rate-indexed local currency lending (assumed to be 74 per cent in 2004 and 61 per 
cent in 2008 in Croatia, and 57 per cent in 2004 and 70 per cent in 2008 in Serbia).  
To put the search for policy solutions on a sounder footing, one needs a better understanding 
of what has driven FX lending in the first place in emerging Europe, and why some emerging 
market regions have managed to de-dollarise whereas in many other transition countries this 
has thus far proven elusive. This paper begins with a survey of the economic literature on 
financial dollarisation, which has grown considerably in size and quality in recent years and 
by now includes several papers on eastern Europe. It next presents some evidence on the 
question of whether factors related to the capital inflow boom—and the European model of 
financial integration more generally—have contributed to loan dollarisation in transition 
economies. Lastly, it analyses the policy implications of this evidence and the de-
dollarisation experiences elsewhere (particularly in Latin America).  
 
The main finding of this paper is that financial dollarisation in emerging Europe has a range 
of causes, from weak institutions and lack of monetary policy credibility (particularly in less 
advanced transition countries) to implicit guarantees associated with expectations of euro 
adoption, foreign funding of banking systems, and lack of local currency market 
infrastructure. Because these causes do not apply to all countries in the region with equal 
force, the right policy response will depend on country circumstances. For the purposes of 
making broad recommendations, three groups of countries are distinguished, based on the 
state of macroeconomic frameworks and institutions, and on the presence of commitments to 
maintain hard pegs ahead of euro membership. Depending on these characteristics, the policy 
response needs to focus primarily on improving macroeconomic institutions and policy 
  3credibility or on regulation or on a combination of both, together with measures to develop 
the legal and institutional infrastructure underlying local currency money and bond markets.  
This leaves two main tasks. The first is to correctly diagnose countries. In particular, in 
countries that lack credible macroeconomic frameworks and institutions, attempts to develop 
local currency markets are unlikely to succeed, and regulatory solutions may well be 
counterproductive, as denominating financial contracts in FX could be an optimal response 
(individually and socially) to an environment of high macroeconomic, institutional, and 
political risk. The second task is to develop a regulatory approach to FX lending that is both 
effective—in particular, avoiding problems of cross-border regulatory arbitrage, which can 
easily arise in financially integrated Europe—and avoids large costs to financial development 
and access to credit. The chapter has something to say on both of these questions, but much 
more remains to be done. 
  41. THEORY: A NON-TECHNICAL SURVEY 
 
A proximate answer to the question of why so much developing country lending is in FX, 
which has been emphasised by market practitioners and academics alike, points to incomplete 
markets—in particular, to a lack of markets for local currency debt at longer maturities.
3 
However, this answer is not fully satisfactory, for two reasons. First, it begs the question of 
why these markets have not developed (or why they have developed in some countries but 
not in others of similar size and per capita income). Second, while the lack of local currency 
debt markets may explain why firms are pushed to borrow in foreign currency, it does not 
explain why a firm would not want a long-term local currency loan even when it could obtain 
one—a situation that an emerging market lender such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) often encounters when it attempts to lend in local 
currency.  
 
Hence to fully address the puzzle of why borrowing in FX is the prevalent form of financing 
in many emerging market countries, one needs to explain why many borrowers seem to 
prefer FX loans even when they have a choice. The superficial answer is that the real interest 
rate of FX-denominated loans compared with local currency-denominated loans is usually 
much lower. But higher local interest rates compared with foreign interest rates in emerging 
market countries reflect exchange rate risk. Therefore, it is necessary to understand why 
borrowers might prefer the cheaper FX loan even though it comes bundled with higher 
currency risk.  
 
As a matter of logic, the answer could fall in two categories. One possibility is that FX risk is 
mispriced in the sense that the differential between local and FX borrowing rates exceeds the 
expected rate of devaluation. Alternatively, it could be that the risk is, in fact, fairly priced. In 
this case, the answer needs to focus on the puzzle of why borrowers nonetheless prefer to pay 
the lower borrowing rate and take the FX risk. 
 
From the perspective of mainstream economics, there is a problem with the first line of 
argument: it involves assuming that uncovered interest parity is not only violated (as an 
empirical matter, it often is) but is systematically violated in one direction. This would seem 
to be an invitation for arbitrage. If FX rates are systematically low relative to FX risk, then 
there should be so much FX borrowing that the imbalance disappears. For this reason, it is 
worth asking first how far one can get in explaining bias toward FX borrowing without 
assuming systematic under pricing of FX risk (we return to the under pricing idea at the end 
of this section).  
 
This is actually the approach that most of the literature has taken. For the sake of determining 
the policy implications, the answers can be grouped in three categories: explanations that 
imply that (unhedged) FX borrowing is both individually and socially suboptimal, is 
individually optimal but may be socially suboptimal, and is optimal both individually and 
socially. 
 
In the first instance, borrowers could prefer the cheaper FX loan because they ignore, 
underestimate, or excessively discount the FX risk that is involved. Strictly speaking, this 
means that borrowers behave irrationally—an unpopular assumption in economics, 
                                                 
3. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999); Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2003). 
  5particularly when it involves many individuals that act independently and when the allegedly 
irrational phenomenon persists over time. However, there are systematic deviations from 
rationality that have been well documented in the recent literature on behavioural economics, 
and these could help explain the phenomenon at hand.
4 Consumers often tend to resolve 
trade-offs between current and future consumption in a way that front-loads consumption 
compared with what they would want to do if they could commit to a particular intertemporal 
path. This type of behaviour could arguably explain why consumers (or small enterprises) 
favour a form of lending that allows higher consumption today, albeit at a cost (or risk) in the 
future. Consumers may realise the risks involved but nonetheless choose to borrow in foreign 
currency today with the intention of hedging or switching to local currency funding soon in 
the future. But because the future always becomes present, that moment never arrives.  
 
In the second case, foreign currency borrowing could be excessive from a social perspective 
but fully rational from an individual perspective as a result of distortions such as borrower 
moral hazard or externalities. 
 
  Moral hazard on the part of the borrower became popular as an explanation for loan 
dollarisation after the Asian crisis, in which implicit guarantees to borrowers and 
investors were widely believed to have played a role.
5 In this scenario, the borrower 
understands the higher risks of FX borrowing but reckons that he or she will not be 
forced to repay in full in the event of a depreciation-related insolvency. This could be 
because of limited liability or because of the existence (or expectation) of state 
support in the event of a devaluation.
6 
  Externalities could be a cause of excessive FX borrowing if the foreign currency 
exposures of individuals aggravate the depth of a crisis, and this effect is not taken 
into account when individuals choose their level and denomination of borrowing (as 
each individual has a negligible impact). In effect, this creates a collective action 
problem that gives rise to excessive FX borrowing.
7 If borrowers (or lenders) made 
the decision collectively, they would internalise the risks of FX borrowing and choose 
a lower level, but since decisions are decentralised, this is not the case. 
 
In the third situation, borrowing in foreign currency (or alternatively, via inflation-indexed 
debt) could be optimal—even from a purely risk-minimising perspective—in an environment 
of high and variable inflation.
8 There is a widely held presumption that it is safer for 
unhedged borrowers whose revenue streams are in local currency to also borrow in local 
currency. However, this presumption may be incorrect because it ignores the fact that the 
borrower commits to a nominal repayment in the future, while the prices of the goods that 
make up the firm’s income stream (or the wages of a household) could change as a result of 
inflation or relative price shocks. Hence borrowing in local currency does not eliminate the 
mismatch problem: it replaces a currency mismatch with a mismatch between real and 
nominal units.  
                                                 
4. For a recent popular survey, see Ariely (2008), particularly chapter 6. 
5. McKinnon and Pill (1999); Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999). 
6. For the case of limited liability, see Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009). On the role of perceived or actual 
state support, see Dooley (2000); Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2001); Schneider and Tornell (2004); 
Rancière, Tornell, and Vamvakidis (2010). 
7. Korinek (2009). 
8. See Parrado and Ize (2002); Jeanne (2003). This approach is close in motivation and philosophy to the 
portfolio approach to deposit dollarisation, which concludes that the optimal currency composition of the 
portfolio of a domestic saver will depend on the trade-off between inflation and real exchange rate volatility (Ize 
and Levy Yeyati 2003).  
  6 
In a stable inflation environment, this mismatch does not matter. With volatile inflation, 
however, committing to a nominal repayment amount in local currency over the period of 
several years may be as risky as, or indeed riskier than, committing to the equivalent (at the 
time of borrowing) foreign currency amount. If inflation turns out to be lower than expected, 
it could leave the borrower saddled with unsustainable high debt (particularly if lower-than-
expected inflation accompanies an adverse real shock, as will often be the case). The safest 
form of financing in this instance would normally be inflation-indexed debt, but that in turn 
may not be feasible if low monetary credibility reflects broader institutional deficiencies, 
which raise doubts about the timeliness and accuracy of inflation measurement, and concerns 
that measurements may be manipulated.
9 As a result, the safest strategy available may be to 
borrow in foreign currency. 
 
Although the economic literature emphasises inflation volatility as the principal cause of risk 
involved with writing financial contracts in local currency, the underlying idea is more 
general. From a borrower’s perspective, the choice of FX versus local currency denomination 
involves trading off currency and real interest rate risk. One reason why real interest rates 
could be volatile is inflation risk. But another reason (when local currency loans involve 
floating interest rates that move in response to expected inflation) could be volatile interest 
rates in response to liquidity squeezes, unpredictable policy moves, or political instability.  
 
The link between low policy or institutional credibility and FX borrowing emphasised in this 
literature represents a broader theme that runs through both corporate finance and modern 
international finance: “dangerous” forms of finance, such as FX borrowing or short-term 
borrowing, could reflect a deep policy or institutional deficiency, such as weak contract 
enforcement or an inability to commit to investor-friendly polices. In such circumstances, 
dangerous finance can be welfare improving, for two reasons.  
 
First, dangerous financial contracts tend to be simple and hard to renegotiate. They do not 
involve a lot of risk-sharing; it is this very fact that makes them potentially dangerous (think 
of simple debt as opposed to equity, or FX debt rather than debt indexed to the consumer 
price index). By the same token, however, they can “work” even in underdeveloped and weak 
institutional settings, and are much less exposed to tampering by governments. For example, 
unlike equity, simple debt does not require well-developed accounting standards or corporate 
governance in order to exist. By the same token, FX debt can thrive even in an environment 
in which poor economic institutions prevent the development of other debt forms.
10 
 
Second, dangerous finance can ameliorate some of the underlying problems (in particular, 
government moral hazard and its counterpart, lack of institutional commitment) by acting as a 
disciplining device. Dangerous debt structures such as short-term or foreign currency debt not 
only protect investors from the consequences of misbehaviour by the borrowing country 
government, but they also raise the stakes for those countries precisely because they 
potentially give rise to deep crises and hence reward behaviour that prevents such crises.
11 
However, an inefficiency arises from the fact that the same crises could be triggered by bad 
luck rather than bad policies. Nonetheless, the net ex ante welfare effect of dangerous debt is 
generally positive in these circumstances: “Dangerous forms of debt are also ‘policy 
                                                 
9. Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005). 
10. Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005). 
11. Jeanne (2000, 2009); Tirole (2003). 




The three explanations summarised above have vastly different implications for public 
policy. If FX bias is caused by borrowers who are either ill-informed or have a tendency to 
procrastinate, then the problem could be solved either through education, or by offering low-
risk instruments that are costly to refinance and hence commit borrowers to prudent 
behaviour (many real-life loans have that feature, which makes procrastination a somewhat 
unconvincing explanation of FX bias). If FX bias results from externalities or simply 
irrational behaviour, the answer lies in regulation (for example, imposing an unremunerated 
reserve requirement on FX bank assets, which would make FX borrowing just expensive 
enough to align its individual cost with its social costs). Lastly, if the cause of FX bias is a 
lack of credible macroeconomic policies or institutions, then the only way to counter the bias 
is to address these institutional weaknesses directly. Thus, in this situation, making FX 
borrowing more expensive or prohibiting FX borrowing by unhedged borrowers will not 
help: rather than encouraging more local currency borrowing, it will simply lead to less 
overall borrowing, and it may aggravate some of the underlying institutional problems by 
eliminating a disciplining device. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, all the theories we have reviewed so far 
“work” under the assumption that FX risk is fairly priced. Recently, however, an alternative 
approach has gained popularity, one that argues that banks under price FX loans relative to 
local currency loans in order to match the currency structure of their assets with that of their 
liabilities.
13 Of course, this idea works only if bank liabilities are also biased toward FX. 
There could be two reasons for this:  
 
  FX deposits. If this is the case, the “puzzle” is merely pushed back one step, as an FX 
bias in deposits would itself require explanation. This leads to a literature on deposit 
dollarisation that argues largely along similar lines as the theories discussed above 
(essentially, invoking optimal portfolio choice of depositors in light of high consumer 
price index volatility compared with real exchange rate volatility; lack of 
macroeconomic credibility, and moral hazard or similar distortions).  
  Foreign currency funding from abroad. This could take the form of subsidiary 
borrowing from a foreign parent (in essence drawing on parent bank deposits) or 
wholesale borrowing of domestic banks. In this view, financial openness, and 
particularly foreign bank entry (if foreign subsidiaries have cheaper access to foreign 
funding than domestic banks), could be a driving force behind the FX bias in 
borrowing. Note that as long as no other distortions are assumed, this could be 
efficient. However, in combination with some of the other distortions described—
limited rationality, moral hazard, externalities, and lack of government commitment—
this channel will reinforce whatever welfare outcomes result from the initial 
distortion.    
 
                                                 
12. Tirole (2003). 
13. Basso, Calvo-Gonzales, and Jurgilas (2007); Luca and Petrova (2008). 
  82. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
There is a recent, but by now quite substantial, empirical literature on the determinants of 
financial dollarisation. A number of papers analyse the Latin American experience during the 
1990s and the beginning of this decade.
14 Others study the correlates of liability and 
sometimes deposit dollarisation in a broad international cross-section of countries.
15 Lastly, 
there is a small recent literature specifically on financial dollarisation in transition 
economies.
16 Most of these papers use aggregate data (typically, with the share of foreign 
currency bank credit in total domestic bank loans to the private non-financial sector as the 
main variable of interest) but a growing number are based on firm data.
17  
 
For the most part, these papers are not set up to discriminate between the main views on 
financial dollarisation that we summarised in the previous section. This said, a few facts 
emerge from these papers that shed light on some of the theories. We summarise them briefly 
as follows. 
 
First, there is consistent support for the view that macroeconomic policy credibility, and 
perhaps institutional quality more broadly, is a determinant of both loan and deposit 
dollarisation. Inflation volatility tends to be associated with higher levels of FX borrowing. 
Proxies for institutional quality matter either in addition to or as alternative proxies for 
instability. In the regressions of De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize (2003), inflation history loses 
significance once proxies for the quality of broad political institutions and governance 
indicators are included. Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005) show that dollarisation is robustly 
related to the sensitivity with which the inflation tax reacts to growth shocks: dollarisation 
thrives in environments in which economic fluctuations lead to macro instability. In Guscina 
(2008), political instability is related to higher shares of FX debt. Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin 
(2009), using data from the 2005 EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), find a strong effect of firm security payments on their 
propensity to borrow in FX. 
 
Second, the interest rate differential is a reliable predictor of loan dollarisation, particularly in 
the cross-section.




Third, there is evidence that floating exchange rates reduce dollarisation. This appears to be 
true both for floating exchange rate regimes and measures of exchange rate volatility.
20 The 
strongest evidence in this regard comes from Latin America, but Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin 
(2009) also find this effect in their study of firm borrowing based on the BEEPS. 
                                                 
14. Martinez and Werner (2002); Barajas and Morales (2003); Gelos (2003); Rossi (2004); Cowan, Hansen, and 
Herrera (2005); Kamil (2008). 
15. De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize (2003); Rajan and Tokatlidis (2005); Jeanne (2003); Levy Yeyati (2005); 
Guscina (2008). 
16. Luca and Petrova (2008); Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez, and Jurgilas (2007); Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009); 
Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008). 
17. Martinez and Werner (2002); Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003); Rossi (2004); Cowan, Hansen, and 
Herrera (2005); Kamil (2008); Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009). 
18. Though Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008) also show some evidence for longitudinal effects. 
19. For effects in Latin American economies, see Barajas and Morales (2003); for those in transition economies, 
see Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009); Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez, and Jurgilas (2007); and Rosenberg and Tirpák 
(2008). 
20. See Kamil (2008) regarding floating exchange rate regimes. 
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Fourth, financial development (typically proxied by credit-to-GDP or M2-to-GDP ratios) 
tends to be positively related to loan dollarisation within developing country samples.
21 This 




Fifth, virtually all studies that use transition economy data agree that foreign funding of bank 
credit is a contributing factor to dollarisation (the literature on Latin America does not 
emphasise this mechanism). There is disagreement, however, on whether foreign banks are 
the culprit or not. In the firm-level regressions of Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009), foreign 
bank presence appears to contribute to dollarisation, although the effect is not always robust. 
Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez, and Jurgilas (2007) show that the share of foreign liabilities of the 
banking system is a very strong predictor of loan dollarisation, and they interpret this effect 
as reflecting the presence of foreign bank subsidiaries. However, Rosenberg and Tirpák 
(2008) show that once the loan-to-deposit ratio is controlled for (their measure of foreign 
funding); the share of foreign banks in the assets of the banking system no longer predicts 
dollarisation. In other words, what appears to matter is foreign funding, not foreign banks per 
se. 
 
Sixth, regulation appears to have some effects, but the literature does not contain a clear 
message on its overall importance. Many papers ignore regulation altogether. The two main 
exceptions are Luca and Petrova (2008) and Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008). Both papers focus 
on transition economies: 
  
  Luca and Petrova look at measures of liberalisation of foreign currency lending and 
deposits, and at a measure of bank hedging opportunities (forward market 
liberalisation). Only the latter seems to have an effect: a deep forward foreign 
exchange market lowers the level of loan dollarisation for a given level of deposit 
dollarisation. (The interpretation is that banks need not lend in dollars to stay matched 
but can instead cover their exposure in the forward market.)  
  Rosenberg and Tirpák define an “FX restriction index” based on measures that 
authorities could take to limit FX liabilities: requiring banks to monitor FX asset risk, 
requiring banks to disclose FX risk to borrowers, imposing eligibility criteria on FX 
customers, requiring banks to provision or hold higher reserves as a function of 
indirect FX exposures, and introducing a ceiling on FX exposures. The FX restriction 
index has a statistically significant impact on loan dollarisation in their model, but the 
effect is economically modest (a fully restrictive regime, on average, lowers FX 
dollarisation by about 2 percentage points). Furthermore, the size of the effect is cut in 
half if loan dollarisation is redefined to include cross-border lending. One 
interpretation is that with open capital accounts, FX restrictions on banks are not very 
effective because they can divert borrowing to non-resident sources. 
 
Lastly, the literature confirms a robust relationship between firm-level “natural hedges”—the 
share of exports in firm revenue, and foreign ownership—and loan dollarisation. Virtually 
every paper confirms that exporters tend to borrow more in FX than nonexporters. This said, 
unhedged borrowers are also significantly indebted in foreign currency. By how much? With 
the exception of Kamil (2008), the literature is silent on this point, reflecting data limitations. 
                                                 
21. Barajas and Morales (2003); Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez, and Jurgilas (2007). 
22. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003). 
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3. RE-EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE TRANSITION REGION 
 
In spite of its richness, the literature discussed in the previous section leaves a number of 
questions open. To ascertain the policy implications for the transition region, it is necessary 
to understand the role of foreign financing or foreign banks over and above that of the more 
standard causes of financial dollarisation that have been identified in the literature. It also 
would be useful to determine the robustness of the results across methodologies and time 
periods for the region. Lastly, it would be helpful to use at least one methodology that allows 
for clearer causal interpretation than is the case in most papers using macroeconomic data. 
Some of the “determinants” of loan dollarisation identified in this literature qualify as deep 
causes of dollarisation (for example, weak institutions). For the most part, however, they 
represent macroeconomic and financial outcomes that are co-determined with dollarisation 
(for example, interest rate differentials or loan-deposit ratios). Hence regressions that attempt 
to uncover the effects of macroeconomic variables on economy-wide measures of 
dollarisation are hard to interpret. 
 
The remainder of this section takes a stab at these problems by extending the analysis of two 
papers in the literature, those of Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009) and Rosenberg and Tirpák 
(2008).
23 The approach is to examine the statistical relationship between FX lending and a 
broad set of explanatory variables—capturing inflation history, institutional quality, exchange 
rate regimes, and the effects of foreign financing and foreign bank ownership, plus additional 
controls—using two different concepts to measure FX lending, and three data sets: 
 
  Firm-level data based on the third (2005) BEEPS, which contains a question about the 
currency denomination of the last loan taken out by the firms participating in the 
survey.
24 The answer to this question—whether the loan was in domestic or foreign 
currency—is represented using a dummy variable, which is regressed on a set of firm 
variables and country variables, including several measures of financial integration. 
  A quarterly macroeconomic dataset with the same country-level variables and the 
same sample period (2002–05). The dependent variable in this analysis is the FX 
share in banking system liabilities for each country.  
  An annual macroeconomic dataset with similar variables but comprising a longer 
period (2000–08). 
 
Table 1 highlights the main results.
25 For each of the three data sets used, it shows the results 
of three statistical models. All models comprise a number of potential country-level 
determinants of FX liabilities, including inflation volatility, a proxy for institutional quality 
(the EBRD governance and enterprise reform index), a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the country had a hard peg and 0 otherwise, the asset share of foreign banks, and an 
                                                 
23. We are very grateful to the authors of these papers for allowing us to use their data for this purpose. 
24. Data are available online at EBRD, “Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey” 
(www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm). 
25. For the full set of regression coefficients, see the tables in appendix B. 
  11additional variable capturing financial integration.
26 There are also a number of additional 
country-level control variables for which the results are not shown, as well as firm-level 
controls in the first group of regressions based on BEEPS data (see table notes and appendix 
tables). The difference between the models used for each data set is in the financial 
integration variable, namely: gross financial integration, cross-border bank lending (using 
data from the Bank for International Settlements), and the loan-to-deposit ratio of the banking 
system. The latter two are used as alternative measures of foreign financing. 
 
The table shows that the governance indicator is a significant and robust determinant of the 
FX lending share, confirming the finding of earlier studies that FX lending is more prevalent 
in countries with weak institutions. The economic magnitude is large, with a 1-point 
improvement on the EBRD transition indicator scale (which runs from 1 to 4.3) associated 
with a reduction in the probability of FX borrowing by 22–33 percentage points (firm-level 
regressions), and a reduction in the share of FX lending of 12–22 percentage points (country-
level regressions). Inflation volatility also matters in two of the three data sets, but its effects 
are less robust (controlling for the governance indicator). Also, the association between hard 
pegs and FX borrowing seems to be strong, particularly in the macroeconomic data. 
 
Regarding the role of foreign financing and foreign banks, there is some disagreement 
between the firm-level and the macroeconomic regressions. In the firm-level regression, the 
presence of foreign banks appears to make FX borrowing more likely. The effect is 
statistically significant in two of the four specifications shown. Additional regressions (using 
a broader set of financial inflow and integration controls for example) reveal a statistically 
significant impact in 10 of 14 specifications. In contrast, the other financial integration 
measures do not seem to have this effect. 
 
In the macroeconomic regressions, only bank lending inflows—but not specifically foreign 
banks—appear to be associated with FX borrowing. According to these regressions, what 
mattered is foreign financing of bank lending in transition countries, regardless of whether 
this took the form of parent bank lending to a subsidiary, direct cross-border lending, or 
syndicated lending.  
 
In summary, there is some evidence that foreign financing or the presence of foreign banks or 
both played a role—on top of determinants such as inflation history, quality of institutions, 
and the exchange rate regime—in encouraging FX lending in transition economies. However, 
the results are not conclusive on whether foreign banks contributed to the FX lending bias 
beyond their role as a conduit for foreign financing. Furthermore, they imply that if there was 
such an effect, it was economically small, with a 10 per cent increase in the share of foreign 
bank assets increasing the probability of FX-denominated lending and the share of FX 
lending by at most 3 percentage points. (See the second column of firm-level regressions in 
table 1) 
 
                                                 
26. Note that in all cases, the variables shown in table 1 are measures of FX lending, not of net FX exposure 
(although the firm-level regressions contain some explanatory variables that control for exposure differences for 
given information about FX lending, such as an exporter dummy). This follows the approach used in most of the 
literature (exceptions include Goldstein and Turner [2004] and Kamil [2008], reflecting lack of information 
about the FX composition of assets and revenue streams of FX borrowers. Very recently, Rancière, Tornell, and 
Vamvakidis (2010) have attempted to construct net exposure measures for transition economies by combining 
FX asset and liability data from banking statistics with firm-level data from the BEEPS. 
 
 
  12Table 1. Determinants of FX lending in transition economies 
Regression coefficients 
Variable GFI BIS L/D GFI BIS L/D GFI BIS L/D
Inflation volatility 0.035 0.026 0.012 5.986 5.499 11.040 -1.823 -4.648 -1.510
(0.010) (0.049) (0.418) (0.308) (0.363) (0.009) (0.204) (0.072) (0.270)
Governance
f -0.321 -0.228 -0.209 -15.800 -13.780 -17.070 -20.070 -17.070 -22.120
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.010) (0.030) (0.010) (0.006) (0.020) (0.001)
Hard peg
g 0.013 0.001 0.075 32.220 33.300 23.350 23.020 24.040 19.500
(0.786) (0.972) (0.280) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.021) (0.018) (0.057)
FI measure 0.060 0.000 -0.185 4.625 0.068 12.940 2.564 0.016 3.048
(0.360) (0.540) (0.057) (0.628) (0.047) (0.390) (0.821) (0.088) (0.842)
Foreign banks 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.122 0.067 0.131 -0.049 0.024 -0.095
(0.000) (0.001) (0.166) (0.243) (0.473) (0.321) (0.775) (0.888) (0.587)
Observations 1,574 1,452 1,541 223 212 196 74 74 59
Number of 
countries
21 19 19 21 20 20 15 15 15
Annual dataset, 2000–08
e Firm regression, 2002–05
c Quarterly dataset, 2002–05
d
Financial integration (FI) measure
b
 
Sources: Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009); Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2008); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006); Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2009); EBRD, BIS; IMF IFS; BEEPS III; Basso, Calvo-Gonzalez, and 
Jurgilas (2007); and data from the EBRD, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), International Monetary 
Fund International Financial Statistics, and BEEPS III. 
 a. p-values are shown in parentheses. The table shows results from three statistical models using three 
datasets. For each dataset, the models differ only in terms of the financial integration measure used. The table 
shows only five variables of interest; additional controls are listed in the notes below. 
b. GFI: level of gross financial integration (external assets + external liabilities in percent of GDP); 
BIS: cross-border bank lending, year-on-year change in percent; L/D: loan-to-deposit ratio. 
c. Firm-level quarterly data, 2002q1–2005q2, probate estimation, marginal effects reported. The 
dependent variable is a dummy for whether the last loan of the firm was in a foreign currency. Following 
Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009), additional controls used include inflation, depreciation and depreciation 
volatility, firm-level controls (exporter dummy, sales to multinationals, international accounting, dummy for 
firm size, age of firm), loan characteristics (duration, collateral) and banking sector and institutional controls 
interest rate differential), FX deposits, CIS dummy, dummy for forward FX exchange market, capital controls, 
and foreign exchange). 
 d. Panel estimation, 2002q1–2005q2. The dependent variable is the share of FX loans to total loans, in 
percent. Estimated using generalised method of moments (GMM), using past values as instruments. Additional 
controls include inflation, depreciation, depreciation volatility, interest differential, and FX deposits. 
e. Panel estimation, 2000–08. The dependent variable is the share of FX loans to total loans, in percent. 
Estimated using GMM, using past values as instruments. Additional controls include inflation, depreciation, 
depreciation volatility, and interest differential. 
f. EBRD governance and enterprise restructuring indicator (defined from 1 to 4.3). 
g. Dummy variable taking the value 1 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, and 0 otherwise. 
 
  134. POLICY 
 
Based on the theory and evidence presented in the previous section, we now sketch the 
outlines of a strategy for addressing the currency mismatch problem in the transition region. 
Before doing so, it is worth reviewing a success story in de-dollarisation: Latin America. 
 
How did Latin America de-dollarise? 
 
Financial dollarisation and currency substitution has been endemic to Latin America for 
many decades. Given the region’s history of crises and macroeconomic volatility, this is not 
surprising. Most major Latin American countries experienced hyperinflation in the 1970s or 
1980s (Colombia is the main exception). In some cases—including Argentina and Brazil—
this lasted into the 1990s.  
 
By the middle of the decade, however, in the wake of “Washington consensus” reform efforts 
and following the conclusion of Brady deals with most major countries and the resolution of 
the painful but brief Tequila crisis, virtually all of Latin America had stabilised to moderate 
or even low levels of inflation. A gradual decline in dollarisation was widely expected to 
follow. But surprisingly, this did not happen. On the contrary, while currency substitution 
(use of FX in current transactions) declined in some countries, deposit and loan dollarisation 
continued to increase. It was this astonishing fact that put financial dollarisation on the map 
and focused the minds of policy-makers and academics alike. The literature described in the 
previous section has its origins in this experience. 
 
Almost immediately after the phenomenon had been understood, however, it began to recede. 
After peaking in the mid- to late 1990s, the FX share in total firm debt fell sharply in Latin 
American countries, albeit from different starting levels (see Chart 2). Progress was even 
more dramatic when export revenues are taken into account, with exports as a percentage of 
short-term dollar liabilities rising from 10-20 per cent to over 100 per cent in Colombia and 
Mexico by 2005, from about 50 per cent to over 100 per cent in Chile, and from less than 5 
per cent to about 50 per cent in Peru. In Brazil the rise was more modest, with export 
coverage of dollar liabilities going from 25 to 45 per cent, but this likely underestimates the 
extent of hedging because it ignores hedges purchased on Brazil’s highly developed 
derivatives markets. 
 
What happened? Roughly, Latin America’s de-dollarisation process seems to have been 
driven by five related events and policy initiatives.
27 
 
                                                 
27. The following account is based on Borensztein and others (2004), Kamil (2008), and various International 
Monetary Fund reports. 
  14Chart 2. Dollarisation of liabilities of the corporate sector in Latin America, 
1992–2007
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 Source: Kamil (2008).  
a.  Shaded area represents period with fixed or pegged exchange rate regime; white area period of managed 
or independent floating.  
 
First, most Latin American countries experienced economic downturns and crises in the 
second half of the 1990s. The first of these was the homegrown 1995 Mexican crisis, but 
most crises took place in the last years of the decade, triggered by a “sudden stop” in 
emerging market finance after the 1998 Russian default and devaluation. The crises ranged 
from relatively orderly recessions (Chile, 1999) to currency collapses, political upheaval, and 
sovereign default (Ecuador, 1998–2000; Argentina, 2001–02). Loan dollarisation played a 
critical role in virtually all of these cases. In the cases of Argentina and Ecuador, sovereign 
debt dollarisation was a contributing cause in sovereign defaults (once the devaluations 
occurred, public sector debt became unsustainable), and dollarisation in the private sector 
created or magnified systemic banking crises in Argentina, Ecuador, and Uruguay (2002–03). 
But loan dollarisation played an important role even in Chile, whose 1999 recession was in 
part a result of an interest rate defence of the currency in 1998. Among the major countries, 
only Brazil managed to escape a recession during this period, and it did so because it spent its 
international reserves in the final months of 1998 on removing private sector currency 
mismatches—much in the same way in which Russia did so 10 years later—just ahead of its 
January 1999 currency crisis.  
 
Second, following these crises, the affected countries switched to flexible exchange rate 
regimes (except Ecuador, which adopted the US dollar as legal tender). Unlike in Asia in the 
1990s and in some transition economies today, these regimes for the most part floated de 
  15facto and not just de jure. There is convincing evidence that this move encouraged de-
dollarisation of corporate liabilities.
28 
 
Third, with the exception of Argentina, the switch to a floating exchange rate regime 
typically accompanied a move (albeit gradual) towards fully fledged inflation-targeting 
regimes and, in some cases, fiscal rules and other structural-fiscal reforms. In other words, 
the monetary and macroeconomic regimes changed not just in a way that made exchange rate 
volatility more visible but also in a way that stabilised inflation expectations and more 
generally made the recurrence of macroeconomically induced crises much less likely.  
 
Fourth, a few years into the new regimes, most countries began to de-dollarise their public 
debts by issuing longer-term nominal peso bonds at gradually longer maturities in domestic 
markets. Mexico led the way, issuing three-year and five-year bonds in 2000, followed by 
seven-year and 10-year bonds in 2002, a 20-year bond in 2003, and a 30-year bond in 2006. 
Most other large Latin American countries followed suit, with Chile, Colombia, and Peru all 
issuing long-term, non-indexed domestic currency bonds by the middle of this decade 
(Argentina did so as part of its 2005 debt exchange). In several of these countries, pension 
reform (the creation of a private pension pillar) is believed to have contributed to demand for 
long-term domestic currency bonds. The icing on the cake came during 2005–07, when 
several of these countries took advantage of favourable global liquidity conditions to issue 
long-term bonds in local currency in international markets, while at the same time buying 
back or prepaying FX-denominated international bonds, such as Brazilian or Mexican Brady 
bonds. 
 
The fifth process factor associated with Latin American de-dollarisation is the development 
of derivatives markets, particularly in Brazil.
29 In the middle of the decade, derivatives 
trading surged in the larger economies in the region, with Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and 
Chile registering a combined daily trading volume of close to US$ 110 billion (notional) in 
2006, of which US$ 46 billion was attributable to Brazil. Brazil and Mexico developed 
exchange-based derivatives markets, while over-the-counter derivatives’ trading was 
dominant in the other countries. Interest rate derivatives (swaps, options, and forward rate 
agreements) represented about 70 per cent of total trading activity; with most of the 
remainder taken up by currency derivatives (FX forwards and swaps).  
 
In contrast, there does not appear to be any direct evidence that regulation of domestic FX 
exposures (either directly or through regulation of the banking system) has contributed to the 
Latin American de-dollarisation process, except in the household sector. For example, 
Colombia and Brazil prohibit households from holding FX deposits with resident banks. 
  
                                                 
28. See Martinez and Werner (2002) for Mexico, and Kamil (2008) for a broader group of countries. 
29. Luca and Petrova (2008). 
  165. ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGY FOR EMERGING EUROPE 
 
As in Latin America in the 1990s, financial dollarisation in emerging Europe has remained 
stubbornly high in this decade despite relatively stable macroeconomic environments since 
the beginning of the decade (if not earlier). However, there are several factors that distinguish 
the recent dollarisation experience in transition economies from that in Latin America, in 
particular, the role of foreign financing of banking systems and expectations of euro 
adoption. Taken together, the economic literature, the Latin American experience, and these 
special factors point to four policy areas that are likely to play a role—to greatly varying 
degrees across countries—in reducing and better managing the currency mismatch problem. 
  
Reforming macroeconomic regimes and institutions 
 
At one level, the persistence of dollarisation in the EBRD region is not surprising. As we 
have shown, dollarisation in Latin American countries did not begin to fall until countries had 
established credible macroeconomic policy frameworks based on floating exchange rates and 
inflation targeting. Very few transition countries have such regimes, namely, the Czech 
Republic (since 1998), Poland (since 1999), Albania (since 2001), Romania (since 2005), 
Hungary (since 2007), and Serbia (since 2009).
30 Tellingly, the two countries with the oldest 
and most established of these regimes, the Czech Republic and Poland, also have the lowest 
rates of dollarisation or euroisation in the region.  
 
In emerging Europe, reforming macroeconomic frameworks and improving credibility could 
mean several things, depending in part on whether countries have the option to freely float 
their currencies or are constrained by international commitments such as participation in the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM2). To the extent that there is no such 
commitment, countries that are serious about de-dollarising can improve their policy and 
institutional credibility by building formal inflation-targeting regimes and demonstrating their 
success over time. Countries with weak fiscal records may also require fiscal-structural 
reforms to make inflation targets credible over the longer term, in addition to central bank 
independence. Fortunately, following the 1998-2000 crises and defaults in three transition 
countries (Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova), many transition countries built a track record of 
sound public finances, although maintaining this track record will be a challenge in light of 
the fiscal burdens arising from the most recent crisis. 
 
Countries that participate in the ERM2 or have the strong intention to adopt the euro in the 
near term ought to focus on the credibility of eurozone entry over the targeted time frame.
31 
In light of high crisis-related deficits, this will require a fiscal adjustment programme to meet 
the Maastricht debt and deficit criteria. The European Central Bank (ECB) could support a 
country’s path to the eurozone through currency swap arrangements against local currencies, 
provided that fiscal consolidation and supportive monetary policy remain on track. These 
arrangements would be similar to swap arrangements between the ECB and EU central banks 
outside the eurozone, such as those of Denmark and Sweden, during the global financial 
crisis, except that they would be used in cases of speculative currency attacks and not 
financial crisis conditions, as long as good macroeconomic policies remain in place.      
 
                                                 
30. Hungary began inflation targeting in 2001 but maintained an additional exchange rate target until late 2007. 
31. On European Union (EU) membership, all new EU member states have agreed to eventually adopt the 
euro—without, however, committing to a timetable.  
  17Developing local currency capital markets 
 
The economic literature does not focus on underdeveloped local currency money and bond 
markets as a cause of dollarisation (rather, it is interpreted as a consequence of the same 
factors that also drive financial dollarisation as commonly defined, that is, dollarisation of 
bank loans and deposits). However, in practice, de-dollarisation experiences often have been 
accompanied by the development of such markets. This link is not necessarily causal: for 
example, the government’s ability to issue long-term bonds in local currency may simply be a 
barometer of its macroeconomic credibility, which directly affects financial dollarisation.  
 
That said, there is a plausible causal link from the development of local currency bond 
markets (typically, beginning with government bonds) to financial de-dollarisation, as 
follows. Moving from back to front in the causal chain, the existence of a corporate bond 
market could help de-dollarise bank loans and deposits by providing local currency funding 
opportunities to banks in an environment in which deposits are mostly dollarised. This could 
broaden the local currency investment opportunities of banks, enabling them to offer local 
currency loans at more attractive terms. Corporate bond markets will in turn require legal and 
market infrastructure—that is, supportive laws, regulations, and institutions. One institution 
that is sometimes cited as a necessary precursor is a liquid (short maturity) money market, 
since it may be critical in the development of a primary dealer network.
32  
 
Developing a corporate bond market may also require the development of a public bond 
market in order to overcome the “first mover” or coordination problems that are often 
associated with financial innovation.
33 Once a yield curve based on government bonds of 
various tenors has been established, corporate bonds can be priced “off” that curve, enabling 
potential investors to disentangle interest rate risk and corporate default risk (relative to the 
government). The same benchmark role can potentially be played by a large (relative to 
potential market entrants) and highly rated private sector borrower, or by investing 
international financial institutions, such as the EBRD or IFC. To serve their purpose, 
benchmark bonds must be liquid, which may not be easy in markets without a developed 
institutional investor base. Domestic currency benchmark bonds that meet these requirements 
exist only in a few transition countries, namely Poland, Hungary, and Russia.  
 
Lastly, a successful corporate bond market requires a “demand side” of local institutional 
investors who are interested in purchasing medium- and long-term financial assets in local 
currency. Private institutions that might play a key role in this regard are pension funds and 
insurances. Both of them need to invest a flow of local currency receipts (contributions or 
premiums) to service future local currency obligations. Hence regulatory frameworks and, 
more generally, market conditions that help the development of non-bank financial 
institutions could play a critical role in building local currency capital markets. 
 
Derivatives markets that allow borrowers to hedge against currency and interest rate risk can 
also help manage currency mismatches. The most obvious channel through which this can 
occur is by allowing FX borrowers to hedge at affordable prices. Somewhat less obviously—
since one might think that the presence of affordable currency hedges may encourage firms to 
borrow more in FX—derivatives markets appear to contribute to the de-dollarisation of 
corporate liabilities.
34 There could be two possible explanations. For a given deposit 
                                                 
32. Schinasi and Smith (1998). 
33. See, for example, Allen and Gale (1994). 
34. Luca and Petrova (2008). 
  18dollarisation, FX markets can help banks hedge foreign currency risk and hence allow them 
to play the role of a buffer between deposit and loan dollarisation. In addition, by allowing 
firms to hedge against (local currency) interest rate risk, derivatives markets may eliminate an 
important factor that pushes firms toward FX borrowing. 
 
Aside from creating market institutions through their own bond issuance, should governments 
provide fiscal or regulatory incentives for creating local currency markets? Tax benefits in 
the form of preferential treatment for long-term local currency savings and lending 
instruments can potentially play a role in building a local currency yield curve. But more 
important may be the removal of fiscal or regulatory obstacles. For example, in Kazakhstan 
pension funds are obligated to hold at least 30 per cent of their portfolio in long-term 
government bonds, many of which earn interest rates below inflation. Reducing this 





Regulation can ameliorate financial dollarisation if the latter is not primarily a reflection of 
lack of macroeconomic credibility but instead is caused by distortions, such as moral hazard 
or a crisis externality, or by irrational or short-sighted behaviour by corporate or household 
borrowers.  
 
Regulation does not seem to have played a critical role in Latin America’s de-dollarisation 
process. However, emerging Europe may be different in this respect, for two reasons. First, 
there is some direct evidence that cross-country differences in regulation help explain cross-
country differences in loan dollarisation in the new member states of the European Union.
35 
Second, and more important, expectations of euro adoption and reliance on foreign funding 
of bank loans—the main factors that seem to distinguish dollarisation in emerging Europe 
from dollarisation in Latin America and elsewhere—imply that regulation could be a 
potentially important remedy in many European countries. Basic macroeconomic credibility 
and inflation problems are less likely to play a role in countries that are in the European 
Union (or EU candidates) and have started their convergence with the eurozone. In addition, 
the convergence process may reinforce some of the underlying causes of dollarisation-
euroisation that are best addressed by regulation, particularly a false sense that the exchange 
rate will remain stable throughout the convergence process (this may have played a role in 
Hungary, see Kiraly, 2009), and that government commitments to stabilise the exchange rate 
give rise to implicit guarantees. Lastly, if foreign funding of the banking system generates 
under-pricing of FX loans, as some papers have suggested, this may also generate a rationale 
for regulation. 
 
The appropriate form of regulation will depend on the nature of the problem, that is, the 
distortion that biases borrowers in favour of FX lending: 
 
  If the problem is that borrowers are misinformed, then the right response is to force 
disclosure of FX risk. In light of large depreciations in some countries, this source of 
FX borrowing preference must have become less relevant as a result of the recent 
financial crisis. 
                                                 
35. Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008). 
  19  If the underlying problem is that FX interest rates are too low because borrowers and 
lenders do not internalise the social risk of FX borrowing in the event of a crisis, then 
the underlying distortion can be corrected through regulatory measures that change 
the relative price of FX and local currency lending. This could take the form of an 
unremunerated reserve requirement for FX lending by banks, higher capital 
requirements for FX loans, or more demanding provisioning requirements for FX 
loans (or, conversely, depending on the demand conditions, lower capital or 
provisioning requirements for local currency lending).
36 These measures will not only 
have the effect of protecting banks’ balance sheets from the higher credit risk that 
they assume by lending to unhedged borrowers but also will result in relatively higher 
FX interest rates, hence levelling the playing field between local currency and FX 
loans. 
  Lastly, if the problem is either implicit guarantees or myopia on the part of the 
borrower, who focuses only on the interest rate differential, then even these more 
heavy-handed regulatory measures might not work unless they make the interest rate 
differential disappear altogether (which may, in turn, be undesirable because it over 
promotes local currency loans to borrowers that are not myopic or do not assume 
guarantees). In this case, the answer may be to place limits on the open FX position of 
borrowers or make some classes of borrowers ineligible for FX loans altogether. 
 
Of the three approaches, the one described last is the least applied and the most difficult to 
implement. However, to the extent that one believes that myopia or implicit guarantees are 
really what is driving demand for FX borrowing by, for example, households or small and 
medium enterprises, it would be well worth exploring. At the practical level, the main 
difficulty is that although many countries have elaborate institutions for monitoring and 
supervising the balance sheet risks of the banking sector, there are no equivalent institutions 
for supervising similar risks in the vastly more populous and fragmented corporate and 
household sectors. As such, instruments that try to limit the FX exposures of these sectors 
tend to be blunt—for example, prohibiting household borrowing in foreign currency 
altogether. 
 
One way to make balance sheet regulations for corporations and households more focused 
without a need to create new agencies might be to impose on banks some of the burden of 
supervising borrower balance sheet structures. In effect, this supervision is already part of the 
natural due diligence process that well-run banks apply to borrowers. For example, when 
households apply for a mortgage loan, they typically need to disclose not only their income 
but also their assets and liabilities. It may not be too difficult to require banks to take account 
of currency risks in the balance sheet of a potential borrower in the same way. A bank would 
need to establish the currency exposure of a corporate borrower and would only be allowed to 
lend in foreign currency if that exposure remains below a certain limit. On the household 
side, a similar principle could be applied, or alternatively, lower loan-to-value ratios could be 
applied for FX borrowers, which would ensure that the borrower retains positive equity even 
after a devaluation of a certain size. This principle underlies Poland’s “Recommendation S,” 
which was introduced in 2006 and is credited with curbing unhedged FX lending during the 
peak of the boom (see box 1 and Chart 3). It is also embodied in a regulation that was 
recently introduced in Hungary. 
                                                 
36. See Korinek (2009) for more on unremunerated reserve requirements for FX lending. 
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Box 1. Poland’s “Recommendation S”
37 
 
Recommendation S on Good Practices Regarding Mortgage-Secured Credit Exposures, introduced 
by the Polish Commission for Banking Supervision in June 2006, comprises two essential elements to 
discourage FX lending. First, it recommends requiring higher creditworthiness when customers apply 
for a residential loan in a foreign currency than when they apply for a zloty loan of the same value. 
Second, and related to this point, it sets a high standard for disclosing FX-related risks. The bank is 
advised to first present a zloty loan offer. When a customer still wishes to take out a foreign currency 
loan, the bank is asked to inform the customer about the currency risk and show a simulation of the 
value of loan instalments assuming zloty depreciation (of 20 per cent and the difference between the 
highest and lowest zloty exchange rate in the past 12 months) and an increase of the interest rate to 
the level of a similar zloty-denominated loan.  
 
Recommendation S has been credited with a rise in the share of local currency loans in new lending 
for the second half of 2006, although it did not affect the overall growth rate of mortgage debt. In 2007 
the narrowing interest rate differential between Poland and Switzerland also may have dampened the 
demand for Swiss franc loans. The renewed demand for FX mortgage loans in 2008 may be 
attributable to the gradual easing of income criteria for FX loans and the appreciation of the zloty until 
the third quarter (see Chart 3).  
 
Chart 3. Net new credit to households, Poland, 2008–10 



























Source: CEIC database and authors’ calculations 
While Recommendation S may not have had a lasting impact on curbing FX borrowing, it may have 
been successful in raising the credit quality of FX loans. Data confirm that Polish FX mortgage 
borrowers tend to be well-educated first-time borrowers with strong employment prospects. As of the 
end of September 2009, the ratio of non-performing FX mortgage loans remained low, at 0.9 per cent, 
versus 2.4 per cent for zloty-denominated mortgages. 
 
In February 2010 the Polish regulator passed “Recommendation (T)” to reduce risk in the banking 
sector, including measures to restrict access to loans for customers with lower incomes (with debt 
payments exceeding 50 per cent of monthly income), to improve the use of the credit register and to 
provide more information to borrowers on risks, especially for foreign currency loans. In addition, it 
updated its recommendation on banks’ FX risk management and FX risk operations. 
 
                                                 
37 This box was prepared by Anatoli Annenkov. For more information, see Polish Commission for Banking 
Supervision (2006).  
 
  21Lastly, it is important to recognise that regulation, particularly in financially integrated 
Europe, may not be effective unless similar regulatory principles apply across jurisdictions. 
Consider, for example, a tough regulation in an eastern European host country of an 
international banking group. If the home country does not impose a similar regulation, the 
host country regulation can be easily circumvented (except in the presence of capital 
controls) by borrowing directly from the parent bank rather than the subsidiary (anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this occurred in some countries before the recent crisis). In addition, 
host countries may not want to apply tougher regulations than exist in other potential host 
countries to avoid discouraging capital inflows.  
 
However, there are unlikely to be any EU-wide regulations entailing higher capital or 
prudential requirements in the foreseeable future, for three reasons. First, there is a 
recognition that the problem is partly rooted in macroeconomic factors that need to be 
addressed first. Second, there is a concern that under the prevailing cyclical conditions, a 
“tax” on FX lending would prolong the credit crunch and slow the recovery in emerging 
Europe. Third, it is unlikely that the 27 EU members will agree on EU-wide regulatory 
changes without conducting the usual impact studies accompanying such changes.  
 
However, there are two pragmatic short-run alternatives to EU-wide regulation. First, 
regulators of internationally active banking groups can affect the operations of these banks. 
Home country supervisors can lead this effort, in close coordination with host supervisors. 
The Austrian authorities, for example, have launched a new supervisory initiative restricting 
Austrian banks’ domestic foreign currency lending to unhedged individuals, and are engaged 
in negotiations with the main Austrian banking groups that aim to apply similar principles to 
the lending of these banking groups in emerging Europe (both to direct cross-border lending 
and to subsidiary lending). Second, the main bank groups could agree among themselves to a 
set of lending standards that in effect embodies and pre-empts the main restrictions that 
regulators might otherwise impose. A combination of the two, with home countries setting 
some basic coordinated guidelines and effectively encouraging banks to incorporate them 
into their lending standards, would be a desirable possibility. 
 
Country insurance  
 
The regulatory measures discussed in the previous subsection are based on acceptance of the 
fact that financial dollarisation cannot be rooted out but instead must be managed so as to 
limit the risks that go along with it. One way of doing that is to manage risks at the macro 
level in addition to the micro level. This means offsetting an aggregate FX mismatch in the 
private sector by a long FX position (ideally, on a contingent basis) in the public sector. In 
the event of a “sudden stop” or other event triggering pressure on the currency, this public 
long FX position can then be mobilised in a way that softens the blow to the private sector. 
This is how Brazil (1998) and Russia (2008) managed pressures on their currencies in light of 
private sector open FX positions. In effect, international reserves were spent to allow the 
private sector to close its FX position either ahead of devaluation (in Brazil) or accompanying 
a very gradual devaluation (in Russia). 
 
The problem with this approach is that it is potentially expensive for the public sector, 
particularly if the “country insurance” consists of hoarding large amounts of international 
reserves. Even worse, if the delivery of FX (or FX risk hedges) from the public to the private 
sector involves a subsidy, then the country insurance mechanism could become a source of 
moral hazard and hence help create the very problem that it is meant to mitigate. That said, 
  22these problems are not insurmountable: for example, FX support will not create a distortion if 
it takes the form of (fairly priced) lending rather than a transfer. Furthermore, country 
insurance could be cheaper if it involves international risk sharing, either through a public 
institution, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or through private contingent 
credit lines.
38 In general, a country that decides to “live with” some degree of private sector 
currency mismatch is well advised to have a crisis mitigation framework in place that will 
allow it to cope with the consequences of pressures on the currency. 
 
                                                 
38. See Caballero and Panageas (2005) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007, chapter 12) for a survey. 
  236. A FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTRY-SPECIFIC DE-DOLLARISATION 
STRATEGIES 
 
Not all of the elements discussed in the previous subsection are equally suited to all emerging 
European countries with private sector loan dollarisation. In particular, two sets of constraints 
or considerations need to be taken into account when defining country-specific strategies to 
reduce or limit the risk of FX exposures. 
 
The first constraint is EU membership or EU candidate status. As argued in the previous 
section, if expectations of euro adoption are a driver of euroisation, this makes it more likely 
that regulation is an appropriate response. Expectations of euro adoption in small countries 
may also make it more difficult to develop local currency capital markets. Lastly, and most 
obviously, international commitments and geography may limit the extent to which countries 
may be able to, or wish to, reform their monetary institutions in the direction of free-floating 
exchange rates and inflation-targeting policies. In particular, several members of the 
European Union have undertaken commitments under the ERM2 that limit currency 
flexibility, or have adopted rigid pegs in anticipation of euro adoption. 
 
Second, attempts to address the causes of dollarisation must take into account the context of a 
specific country. In particular, it does not make sense to push the development of local 
currency bond markets in countries that have not reached a minimum level of 
macroeconomic policy and institutional credibility (if attempted, such efforts would fail). It 
may make even less sense, in such countries, to try to reduce financial dollarisation through 
regulatory measures because financial dollarisation may be a constrained-optimal response to 
a weak institutional environment. In other words, although regulation might be successful in 
reducing financial dollarisation, this may come at the expense of precluding access to finance 
by unhedged borrowers and perhaps shutting down some forms of finance (for example, 
longer-term borrowing) altogether.  
 
Taken together, these constraints suggest three ways of grouping countries. The first category 
consists of those countries with weak institutions and volatile macroeconomic environments. 
To address financial dollarisation in this group, the strategic focus should be on building 
credible macroeconomic policy frameworks and institutions, and allowing more exchange 
rate flexibility. To support this process, countries can attempt to limit external volatility, for 
example, through an IMF-supported arrangement or credit line. Attempts to develop local 
currency markets and limit financial dollarisation through regulatory means can receive less 
emphasis during this phase. 
 
In the second category are those countries that have built reasonably strong macroeconomic 
institutions and are either not candidates for the euro or not constrained by the ERM2 or by 
hard euro pegs. Countries in this group could mobilise all four elements of the strategy 
described above, to varying degrees. They should continue to build macroeconomic policy 
credibility in the context of floating exchange rates, develop local currency markets and 
possibly derivatives markets (except in countries that are so small that they would not meet 
minimum scale and liquidity requirements), strengthen regulations, and seek country 
insurance to minimise risks while the de-dollarisation process is ongoing.  
 
The last group consists of EU members that participate in the ERM2 or have committed to 
hard pegs in anticipation of euro adoption. These countries should focus on regulatory 
measures to mitigate risks associated with FX mismatches on the road to the euro. Such 
  24countries could also strengthen, in collaboration with the ECB and the European 
Commission, their policy credibility by committing to a strong convergence programme 
towards, and then within, the ERM2 framework to meet the Maastricht criteria. The ECB 
could facilitate these countries’ path to the eurozone by providing genuine euro currency 
swap facilities against local currencies, as long as countries’ convergence programmes 
remain on track.    
 
The question is which countries fall in which categories. This is easy to answer for some 
countries, but there is a “grey zone” (and judgement) involved with classifying others. 
 
ERM2 participants or countries with hard pegs in anticipation of euro entry include the 
Baltic countries and Bulgaria. Countries that are outside the European Union and do not 
currently have candidate status make up the complementary group. This leaves highly 
euroised EU members or candidates such as Hungary, Romania, and possibly Croatia in a 
grey zone. For these countries, both choices could be on the table: to build further on past 
progress in improving institutions and local currency markets with the aim of reducing 
euroisation, or to accept euroisation and manage its risks, primarily through regulation. 
Regardless of which “box” these countries fit in, regulation can be expected to play a role, for 
reasons explained in the last section. At the same time, these countries have room to 
strengthen both monetary and fiscal policy credibility and to improve local capital market 
infrastructure. Hence they should not confine themselves to a “regulation only” approach. 
 
It is also difficult, but not impossible, to attempt to classify countries according to monetary 
policy credibility. One approach is to examine the inflation volatility data underlying the 
regressions shown in table 1. This will identify the set of countries for which inflation 
volatility is a key driver of dollarisation, according to the regressions; however, this set is, in 
turn, somewhat sample specific. Another approach to the issue is to ask in which countries, 
with the benefit of hindsight, lending in local currency would have led to more predictability 
in the debt burden, over the medium term, than lending in euros or dollars (see box 2 and 
Table 2). Where this applies, the local currency should have proved itself a better—less 
risky—unit of account for financial contracts than foreign currency.  
 
Both approaches give roughly consistent answers, suggesting that a macroeconomic 
credibility problem is probably not the main driving factor behind loan dollarisation in central 
European and the Baltic countries, whereas it is more likely to be an issue in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Balkans region. How one delineates the 
boundary between these groups will depend on whether memories of high inflation in the 
1990s are considered to affect monetary policy credibility today, and on whether in assessing 
credibility, one focuses only on inflation volatility or also considers nominal interest rate 
volatility driven by liquidity squeezes, erratic macroeconomic policies, and political shocks. 
The latter approach would expand the group of countries for which policy credibility is 
deemed to be an issue. 
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Box 2. Comparing the riskiness of local currencies and euros as currencies of 
denomination 
 
Suppose a firm, producing one unit of real output t periods in the future, had been given the choice of 
borrowing long term, either in local currency units or in euro units, both at a fixed interest rate. Viewed 
from the present, the debt due at time t (expressed in whatever units it was contracted in) is known 
with certainty. What is not known, however, is the repayment capacity of the firm expressed in the 
same currency unit that was used to fix the repayment amount. Suppose that uncovered interest 
parity holds, so that future debt constitutes the same share of expected firm revenue regardless of 
what unit debt and revenue are expressed in. Then the probability that the firm will be able to repay its 
debt in local currency will be higher than if it is denominated in euros if and only if the volatility of 
future output in local currency units is lower than that of future output expressed in euros. Thus one 
way of assessing the relative riskiness of local currency debt versus euro debt is simply to compare 
the volatility of output expressed in the two units.  
 
Table 2 undertakes this comparison, for three different measures of volatility. First, to assess the risk 
faced by the borrower from not knowing precisely what the value of his production will be in the units 
in which the debt has been contracted, one ideally would want to compare the predictability of output, 
over a t horizon, expressed in the various units (see Borensztein and others 2004, box 1). The group 
of columns on the left side of the table do so by computing the standard deviations of the forecast 
error of cumulative GDP growth over a four-year horizon, computed as the difference of four-year-
ahead World Economic Outlook (WEO) forecasts made for 2005 (in the 2001 WEO), for 2006 (in the 
2002 WEO), and so on, and comparing them with the actual GDP values for these years.  
 
Focusing on this measure, the results indicate (not surprisingly) that a number of central European 
countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) would have 
been better off denominating debt in local currency units versus euro units. Most other countries 
(including those with hard pegs, all of which have resisted devaluation so far, and most members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States and the South East Europe Program) would have fared 
better with euro-denominated debt. There are two anomalies: Tajikistan and the United States, which 
is included as a memorandum item together with a few other advanced countries. This can be 
attributed to the tiny sample of only five observations underlying each standard deviation. 
 
To get around the sample size problem, we additionally compute the standard deviation of growth 
itself (rather than cumulative growth forecasts) over two horizons: 1994-2009, a period comprising 
almost the entire transition sample except for the early stabilisation and liberalisation years; and 
2001–09 (2009 is always included to reflect crisis-related devaluations in the volatility measures). As it 
turns out, the longer sample is often still dominated by high inflation experiences in the first half of the 
1990s. For this reason, local currency units very rarely emerge as the volatility-minimising unit of 
account. This changes if the sample period is reduced to 2001–09, with local currency denominations 
emerging as the variance-minimising unit in most countries. The exceptions are Belarus, Tajikistan, 
and Serbia (and most of the hard peg countries, as mentioned above). 
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Box 2 (continued) 
 
Table 2. GDP volatility: comparison of standard deviations across currency units 
SD SD SD
Country Local Euro minimizing Local Euro minimizing Local Euro minimizing
nsition
lbania              3.0 17.8 Local 11.9 17.0 Local 3.0 6.4 Local
rmenia 19.1 10.5 Euro 1,169.3 22.2 Euro 6.2 13.9 Local
zerbaijan 96.0 12.7 Euro 532.5 23.7 Euro 22.3 24.4 Local
arus 149.0 13.2 Euro 416.0 85.1 Euro 22.6 12.1 Euro
lgaria             13.2 7.0 Euro 217.9 20.8 Euro 5.2 4.5 Euro
roatia 6.8 14.7 Local 29.2 8.4 Euro 3.5 4.9 Local
zech Republic 5.7 12.7 Local 5.3 7.5 Local 3.8 8.7 Local
tonia              19.9 17.3 Euro 12.1 12.3 Local 8.5 8.4 Euro
eorgia              13.9 11.0 Euro 2,085.9 30.2 Euro 5.1 10.5 Local
ungary              5.6 20.0 Local 8.1 7.0 Euro 4.0 8.1 Local
hstan           50.1 26.1 Euro 323.4 31.4 Euro 11.4 16.5 Local
yrgyz Republic      43.8 16.0 Euro 29.0 18.3 Euro 8.6 8.8 Local
atvia               34.8 14.4 Euro 11.6 16.7 Local 12.6 12.5 Euro
ithuania            12.4 7.9 Euro 14.6 14.4 Euro 6.8 6.4 Euro
ia, FYR 19.7 11.6 Euro 35.4 8.8 Euro 5.1 5.2 Local
dova              32.1 12.8 Euro 36.5 15.6 Euro 6.7 11.0 Local
golia             50.8 11.7 Euro 20.1 16.0 Euro 11.5 15.7 Local
and               15.7 18.2 Local 13.2 9.7 Euro 2.7 11.8 Local
omania 22.5 14.5 Euro 39.5 11.1 Euro 11.0 11.3 Local
ussia 32.4 23.7 Euro 63.9 24.2 Euro 9.3 16.3 Local
bia
b ... ... ... 28.7 17.9 Euro 27.1 13.2 Euro
lovak Republic 9.2 13.6 Local 12.2 11.1 Euro 3.7 5.9 Local
lovenia 1.6 11.5 Local 4.2 3.8 Euro 3.6 3.0 Euro
ajikistan 19.3 19.4 Local 98.6 25.7 Euro 8.5 7.3 Euro
urkey 142.0 31.3 Euro 34.8 15.8 Euro 15.4 15.3 Euro
urkmenistan         133.7 52.8 Euro 338.5 27.2 Euro 16.7 18.5 Local
kraine 54.2 40.0 Euro 186.1 18.8 Euro 9.6 18.5 Local
zbekistan           28.5 20.3 Euro 289.0 18.2 Euro 10.7 17.3 Local
emorandum
anada               6.6 19.9 Local 2.9 9.4 Local 3.2 7.1 Local
                3.7 6.2 Local 2.0 10.6 Local 2.2 8.0 Local
nited Kingdom       5.0 28.1 Local 2.0 9.3 Local 2.5 8.2 Local

















































































Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the IMF's World Economic Outlook, various years.   
  a. Standard deviation of percentage differences between four-year-ahead GDP forecasts published in the spring 
2001–05 editions of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and realised (or in the case of 2009, projected) GDPs 
based on the April 2009 WEO.   
  b. For data availability reasons, the sample for Serbia starts in 1997. 
  c. Standard deviation of cumulative five-year-ahead forecast errors based on previous year's projected growth 
rate (that is, the 2000 rate is used to generate the cumulative forecast for 2005, the 2001 rate is used to generate 
the forecast for 2006, and so on). 
              
           Chart 4 summarises the discussion in this chapter. The top right cell shows countries for 
which tighter regulation and fiscal consolidation are the main options to manage the risks of 
currency mismatches, both because weak institutions are not the principal underlying 
problem in these countries, and because existing policy commitments limit the options for 
institutional reform and for local currency capital market development.  
 
The bottom left cell includes countries for which the macroeconomic and institutional 
credibility is probably the main issue at this point, and regulation and aggressive market 
development is unlikely to be useful (or could even be counterproductive) until some degree 
of credibility has been achieved.  
 
Lastly, the top left cell includes the remaining countries, which will want to use combinations 
of all tools to address currency mismatches. Within this heterogeneous group, the emphasis 
given to particular tools will vary, with more prominence given to regulation in countries 
with relatively advanced institutional environments and membership in, or proximity to, the 
European Union. Furthermore, country size may limit the scope for local market 
development, particularly in some countries in south-eastern Europe. 
 
Note that the bottom right cell is empty. In a sense, countries such as Montenegro, which 
have unilaterally adopted the euro, fit in this area; however, their adoption of the euro 
precludes the need for a further policy response, at least conditional on that policy choice. 
 
Chart 4. Framework for policy responses to liability dollarisation in transition 
economies 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
As in other emerging market regions, liability dollarisation in emerging Europe and in the 
transition economies further east has multiple causes. First among these is lack of 
macroeconomic credibility. In some countries, high inflation volatility may have encouraged 
financial contracts in foreign currency as opposed to local currency. Even in countries with 
more solid inflation track records, imperfect credibility has meant that FX borrowing has 
typically been cheaper than local currency borrowing. Whether combined with implicit 
guarantees associated with hard pegs, or simply the result of disregard for exchange rate risk 
in light of low exchange rate volatility and expected euro adoption in the medium term, this 
factor has created incentives for foreign currency borrowing. Abundant foreign financing 
appears to have aggravated the situation, perhaps because it led to more aggressive pricing of 
FX loans.  
 
Policy responses to the liability dollarisation problem will be successful only if they are 
shaped by the correct diagnosis. In countries in which monetary and fiscal institutions are 
weak and resort to the inflation tax remains a concern, regulatory responses—making FX 
lending more expensive or banning it outright—could be counterproductive, as they may lead 
borrowers to take higher risks or undermine lending altogether. In these countries, the 
reforms must focus on the core of the problem by reforming macroeconomic institutions and 
strengthening public finances. In the remaining countries, regulation can play a useful role, 
but it should be embedded in a broader strategy that seeks to further improve macroeconomic 
credibility and develop local currency markets.  
 
Regulation can be useful through two channels: first, by limiting corporate and household FX 
exposures and hence the risks associated with currency mismatches, even while much of the 
financial system remains dollarised; and second, by correcting distortions that may have 
made FX borrowing too cheap. At the same time, regulation to address the FX liability bias 
needs to be designed with care. Like any regulation, it comes at the cost of making potentially 
welfare-improving transactions more expensive or impeding them altogether. This is a 
particular concern at a time when net credit growth is still weak or negative in many 
emerging European countries, and many households and firms need to refinance FX debts. 
When introducing such regulation, policy-makers will need to trade off these risks against the 
desire to take advantage of post crisis political momentum favouring financial sector reforms. 
 
Lastly, attempts to introduce regulation need to address the cross-border coordination 
problem. In a financially integrated Europe, where cross-border banking groups own the bulk 
of financial system assets in many emerging European countries, regulatory discrepancies 
across countries could lead to regulatory arbitrage: shopping for loans where regulation is the 
weakest. This can be avoided through EU-wide regulation that is also adopted in the EU 
neighbourhood. In the absence of such regulation, informal coordination between regulatory 
authorities can help. One good thing to emerge from the ongoing crisis is that it has created 
mechanisms for cross-border coordination in the context of crisis management.
39 The success 
of the post crisis clean-up and reform effort could hinge on whether these mechanisms can be 
maintained and developed beyond the crisis. 
 
                                                 
39. See EBRD, 2009, box 1.4). 
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Appendix A: Regression variables and definitions 
 
 
Variable name   Definition            
Forex   loan 1 = last loan of firm was in a foreign currency, 0 = last loan of firm was in local currency.  
Duration   Duration of the loan, in months.            
Collateralised  1 = yes, 0 = no.              
          
Exporter   1 = firm has export revenues, 0 = otherwise.          
Income via bank   Share of firm revenues that are received through bank transfers.      
International 
accounting 
1 = firm applies international accounting standards (IAS or USGAAP),0 = otherwise.  
Small firm   1 = less than 50 employees, 0 = otherwise.          
Age   Age of firm at time of loan disbursement, in years.        
Security costs  Expenses for security services over sales.          
State firm  1 = at least 50 per cent of ownership in state hands, 0 = otherwise.      
Interest differential  Money market rate minus euro repo rate, in the past quarter.  
          
Deprec. volatility   Variance of monthly changes in the real exchange rate versus euro, in percent, during the past 
four quarters. 
Depreciation   Depreciation of local currency versus the euro, nominal, in percent, during the past quarter.  
Peg  1 = country has crawling peg, fixed peg, or currency board exchange rate regime, 0 = otherwise. 
EU  1 = country is or has completed negotiations to become EU member, 0 = otherwise. 
Inflation   Consumer price inflation, in the past quarter.          
Inflation volatility   Variance of monthly changes in the consumer price index, in percent, during the past four 
quarters.  
Foreign banks   Assets share of foreign controlled banks in domestic banking system, in percent.   
Governance  EBRD index of enterprise reform. Scale: 1 to 4.33.       
Forex deposits  Share of deposits in the banking sector denominated in foreign currency, in percent.   
CIS   1 = country is member of Commonwealth of Independent States, 0 = otherwise.   
Forward FX market   1 = country has developed forward FX market, 0 = otherwise.   
Capital controls   1 = country has controls on foreign borrowing by or foreign direct investment in domestic 
firms, 0 = otherwise. 
Open FXposition  Maximum total open FX position of banks over capital, in percent.   
          
GFI[  Gross financial integration, defined as stock of external assets and liabilities, percent of GDP. 
fintliab   Total external liabilities, percent of GDP. 
fintdebl   External debt liabilities, percent of GDP.  
L\D  Loan-to-deposit  ratio.        
kaopen  Chinn-Ito index of capital account liberalisation.       
ca_3  Average current account deficit in the three years previous, percent of GDP. 
BIS  FX-adjusted quarterly change in the asset position of commercial banks reporting to the Bank 
for International Settlements, in percent, from the BIS locational database. 
fintdebt_ch  Three-year change in external debt, percent 
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Variable GFI BIS L/D fintliab fintdebl ca_3 fintdeb_ch kaopen
Inflation volatility 0.0353 0.0255 0.0118 0.0355 0.0337 0.0629 0.0337 0.0292
(0.010) (0.050) (0.418) (0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.009) (0.038)
Governance -0.321 -0.228 -0.209 -0.317 -0.299 -0.440 -0.300 -0.224
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
Hard peg 0.013 0.001 0.075 0.015 0.009 0.204 0.007 0.001
(0.786) (0.972) (0.280) (0.756) (0.857) (0.005) (0.889) (0.981)
FI measure 0.0601 -0.0003 -0.1850 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0103 0.0006 -0.0061
(0.360) (0.540) (0.057) (0.331) (0.487) (0.202) (0.490) (0.821)
Foreign banks 0.060 0.000 -0.185 0.001 0.001 -0.010 0.001 -0.006
(0.000) (0.001) (0.166) (0.000) (0.000) (0.544) (0.000) (0.004)
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.002
(0.933) (0.915) (0.969) (0.968) (0.980) (0.544) (0.992) (0.793)
Interest differential -0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.002
(0.863) (0.477) (0.915) (0.760) (0.773) (0.051) (0.855) (0.501)
Depreciation -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001
(0.175) (0.620) (0.223) (0.145) (0.119) (0.0163) (0.134) (0.621)
Depreciation volatility 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.002
(0.234) (0.592) (0.355) (0.232) (0.254) (0.264) (0.252) (0.556)
Exporter 0.115 0.127 0.121 0.115 0.114 0.132 0.114 0.128
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales to multinationals 0.0349 0.0346 0.0386 0.0347 0.0361 0.0594 0.0359 0.0326
(0.381) (0.411) (0.346) (0.382) (0.363) (0.211) (0.366) (0.439)
International accounting 0.0480 0.0590 0.0627 0.0477 0.0476 0.0473 0.0475 0.0573
(0.270) (0.244) (0.176) (0.272) (0.273) (0.390) (0.275) (0.253)
Small firm  -0.004 -0.014 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.022 -0.004 -0.012
(0.893) (0.671) (0.982) (0.908) (0.902) (0.603) (0.896) (0.701)
Age -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.558) (0.691) (0.315) (0.561) (0.540) (0.414) (0.543) (0.696)
CIS -0.128 -0.129 -0.0565 -0.136 -0.122 -0.0551 -0.118 -0.140
(0.098) (0.084) (0.450) (0.087) (0.102) (0.478) (0.112) (0.058)
Forward FX market  -0.0142 -0.0812 -0.0228 -0.0129 -0.0158 0.0181 -0.0211 -0.0734
(0.826) (0.150) (0.737) (0.841) (0.806) (0.811) (0.741) (0.163)
Capital controls  -0.0690 -0.0806 -0.0857 -0.0646 -0.0621 -0.0504 -0.0644 -0.0825
(0.059) (0.009) (0.015) (0.061) (0.063) (0.237) (0.064) (0.075)
Open FX position 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.006
(0.040) (0.000) (0.048) (0.048) (0.060) (0.000) (0.061) (0.004)
EU -0.011 0.000 0.006 -0.015 -0.015 0.010 -0.013 0.001
(0.842) (0.998) (0.914) (0.785) (0.790) (0.836) (0.820) (0.981)
Forex deposits -0.00303 -0.00191 -0.00154 -0.00307 -0.00326 -0.00958 -0.00326 -0.00185
(0.032) (0.158) (0.345) (0.027) (0.015) (0.000) (0.017) (0.175)
Collateralized -0.0169 -0.0102 -0.0178 -0.0171 -0.0161 -0.00614 -0.0165 -0.00927
(0.752) (0.862) (0.738) (0.750) (0.767) (0.929) (0.762) (0.874)
Duration 0.00314 0.00307 0.00291 0.00314 0.00314 0.00341 0.00313 0.00310
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of observations 1574 1452 1541 1574 1574 1121 1574 1461
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 2 11 91 92 12 11 52 12 0
Foreign financing/integration measure (FI measure)
 
 
 Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009) and Rosenberg and Tirpák 
(2008). 
 a. For variable definitions see appendix A. p-values are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable is dummy 
variable denoting whether firm's last loan was in FX (1) or local currency (0). 
  34APPENDIX 





GFI BIS L/D fintliab fintdebl ca_3 fintdebt_ch kaopen
Inflation volatility 5.986 5.499 11.04 6.101 5.543 11.47 5.687 5.856
(0.308) (0.363) (0.009) (0.285) (0.255) (0.013) (0.276) (0.304)
Governance -15.8 -13.78 -17.07 -15.08 -15.43 -15.13 -14.37 -23.47
(0.010) (0.030) (0.010) (0.017) (0.030) (0.150) (0.032) (0.010)
Hard peg 32.22 33.3 23.35 32.12 35.64 39.53 35.64 27.95
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.006)
FI measure 4.625 0.068 12.94 0.0600 -0.177 -0.019 -0.110 4.834
(0.628) (0.047) (0.390) (0.630) (0.171) (0.979) (0.351) (0.216)
Foreign banks 0.122 0.0665 0.131 0.102 0.0958 0.0916 0.0652 0.0944
(0.243) (0.473) (0.321) (0.374) (0.314) (0.473) (0.484) (0.406)
Inflation -1.268 -1.634 -1.243 -1.312 -1.200 -1.508 -1.141 -0.932
(0.098) (0.047) (0.133) (0.082) (0.128) (0.018) (0.150) (0.283)
Interest differential 0.785 0.919 0.682 0.747 0.704 1.823 0.646 0.473
(0.092) (0.028) (0.084) (0.084) (0.104) (0.001) (0.170) (0.293)
Depreciation -0.188 0.0255 -0.316 -0.196 -0.113 -0.386 -0.143 0.0275
(0.502) (0.922) (0.246) (0.490) (0.659) (0.281) (0.573) (0.918)
Depreciation volatility 0.505 0.580 0.486 0.487 0.625 0.290 0.593 0.257
(0.389) (0.326) (0.437) (0.394) (0.231) (0.702) (0.285) (0.644)
Forex deposits -0.159 -0.211 -0.240* -0.146 -0.220 -0.576 -0.198 -0.0998
(0.407) (0.226) (0.099) (0.456) (0.228) (0.182) (0.275) (0.602)
Capital controls  -14.39 -11.85 -12.95 -13.81 -15.82 -7.529 -14.89 -12.14
(0.010) (0.029) (0.017) (0.019) (0.0123) (0.307) (0.015) (0.085)
Number of observations 223 212 196 223 223 164 223 214
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 2 12 02 02 12 11 62 12 0
Foreign financing/integration measure (FI measure)
 
 
  Source:  See  table  B-1.         
 a. For variable definitions, see appendix A. p-values are shown in parentheses. Dependent variable is percent of 
FX lending in total lending. Estimated using Generalized Method of Moments.    
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Variable GFI BIS L/D fintliab fintdebl ca_3 fintdebt_ch kaopen
Inflation volatility -1.823 -4.648 -1.510 -1.822 -1.814 -1.182 -1.757 -3.631
(0.204) (0.072) (0.270) (0.180) (0.178) (0.361) (0.188) (0.137)
Governance -20.07 -17.07 -22.12 -20.64 -20.7 -21.43 -19.73 -21.47
(0.006) (0.020) (0.001) (0.005) (0.010) (0.020) (0.013) (0.005)
Hard peg 23.02 24.04 19.57 22.68 24.86 11.98 23.77 18.6
(0.021) (0.018) (0.057) (0.018) (0.023) (0.211) (0.029) (0.031)
FI measure 2.564 0.0164 3.048 0.106 -0.123 -1.339 -0.0122 7.137
(0.821) (0.088) (0.842) (0.487) (0.525) (0.424) (0.937) (0.000)
Foreign banks -0.0486 0.0237 -0.0946 -0.0648 -0.0107 0.0620 -0.0430 -0.0771
(0.775) (0.888) (0.587) (0.714) (0.951) (0.722) (0.832) (0.642)
Inflation -0.0123 -0.0645 -0.289 -0.0925 0.0863 0.238 0.0409 -0.0569
(0.981) (0.961) (0.702) (0.864) (0.884) (0.748) (0.945) (0.963)
Depreciation volatility 0.255 1.702 0.208 0.271 0.268 -0.00621 0.218 1.425
(0.703) (0.156) (0.739) (0.677) (0.676) (0.992) (0.729) (0.209)
Depreciation 0.0553 0.0766 0.134 -0.0287 0.178 0.0188 0.0855 0.00307
(0.834) (0.775) (0.674) (0.906) (0.478) (0.939) (0.768) (0.992)
Interest differential -0.862 -1.059 -0.743 -0.937 -0.707 -1.325 -0.818 -0.606
(0.158) (0.0406) (0.141) (0.101) (0.300) (0.044) (0.131) (0.190)
Number of observations 79 74 64 79 79 61 79 74
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 1 61 51 61 61 61 31 61 5
Foreign financing/integration measure (FI measure)
 
 
  Source:  See  table  B-1.         
 a. p-values in parentheses. Dependent variable is percent of FX lending in total lending. Variable names as 
shown in appendix A except that inflation now denotes the previous year's consumer price index 
inflation; depreciation, the percent change of local currency per euro during the previous year; inflation 
volatility, the standard deviation of monthly inflation over the previous five years; and depreciation 
volatility, the standard deviation of monthly percent changes in the bilateral real exchange rate against 
the euro. Estimated using Generalized Method of Moments.  .     
           
           
           